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Abstract 
This paper sought to examine conspiracy theory (CT) use across three types of groups: radical 
violent extremists (RVE), non-violent extremists, and moderates. Using the theory of 
significance quest, or the desire for one’s life to have meaning (Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, 
Fishman, & Orehek, 2009), I sought to determine whether RVE groups were more likely to use 
CTs, invoke need for cognitive closure (NFCC) via the use of time pressure, elicit anomie, and 
promote significance quest through violence than the other groups. Using text analysis software, 
I pulled passages from six groups – two from each level of extremism - that had conspiratorial 
language and then coded for the variables described above. RVE groups were significantly more 
likely than the other groups to use CTs and invoke NFCC through time pressure but were less 
likely than non-violent groups to elicit anomie. In addition, RVE groups were more likely to 
promote significance gain through action, but not significance restoration or prevention of 
significance loss. Implications of the findings are discussed. 
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The Truth is Out There: The Use of Conspiracy Theories by Radical Violent Extremist 
Organizations 
Although terrorism has existed for millennia (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006), the rise of 
global Salafist terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida (AQ) and the Islamic State in Iraq and el-Sham 
(ISIS), as well as their ability to carry out devastating attacks on a global scale, has prompted 
renewed interest in the root causes of and remedies for extremism (Horgan, 2017). Indeed, the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism reported that in 
2015 alone there were 11,774 terrorist attacks  resulting in approximately 28,328 deaths 
worldwide (Dodwell, Milton, & Rassler, 2016). Although conspiracy theories (CTs) have been 
proposed as a tool of radical violent extremist groups (Mcgregor, Hayes, & Prentice, 2015), the 
use of conspiracy theories in the recruitment process is less well-known. Conspiracy theories 
increase individuals’ feelings of anxiety, distrust towards institutions, and feelings of 
powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999), all of which may increase 
one’s propensity for radical violent extremism (RVE, Hogg, Kruglanski, & van den Bos, 2013; 
McGregor et al., 2015). The purpose of this study is to examine the prevalence of CTs in 
recruitment materials RVE groups as well as the cognitive mechanisms they are designed to 
elicit in potential recruits. 
Radical Violent Extremism and Recruitment 
Terrorism has long been used as a means for exerting political pressure, but the term 
itself is notoriously difficult to pin down (Horgan, 2017). Crenshaw (2002) noted that the term 
“terrorism” is often used pejoratively, rhetorically, and with little specificity, resulting in poor 
construct validity. Kruglanski and Fishman (2009; pg. 3) found 109 different definitions in the 
research literature and settled on terrorism as “the symbolic use of violence by non-state actors 
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with social and political (hence not purely criminal) objectives intended to intimidate, frighten, 
or coerce a wider audience than the direct (instrumental) targets of the attack.” The main 
component of terrorism is that violence is employed in a symbolic way and meant to achieve a 
larger political goal. The victims are not the real targets of terrorist actions, but rather the means 
through which the actions have their intended effects. 
Recent research has found that social forces are more important than demographic factors 
in explaining the radicalization process (Atran, 2003; Haddad & Khashan, 2002; Post et al., 
2009; Sageman, 2004). These forces are prominent especially in the Middle East, and create the 
context in which tacit support for terrorism is normalized. Atran (2003) argues that “apparently 
extreme behaviors may be elicited and rendered commonplace by particular historical, political, 
social, and ideological contexts” (pg. 1536). In other words, societies with cultures that condone 
or, at the very least, don’t condemn violence against civilians for a political purpose may 
normalize this behavior and thus make engaging in terrorism more likely. Conspiracy theories 
may play a role in this process, as they promote beliefs that are designed to specifically target 
particular groups (e.g., Jews, Westerners) against whom proponents of the theories wish to 
nurture society-wide grievances.  
Pathways to Conspiracy Thinking 
Conspiracy theories are defined as “narratives in which multiple agents are believed to be 
working together toward malevolent ends” (Swami, Weis, Lay, Barron, & Furnham, 2016, pg. 
86). Conspiracy theories are pernicious and widespread. Half of Americans believe in at least 
one conspiracy (Chapman University, 2016; Oliver & Wood, 2014), and changing people’s 
conspiracy beliefs is notoriously difficult (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013). Belief in CTs 
is linked to an overall distrust of mainstream narratives, as well as anomie, or distrust in 
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institutions (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Durkheim, 1893). Interestingly, the support of different 
CTs persist regardless of the specifics of these conspiracies, many of which contradict each other 
(Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012).  
Because of the closed, self-referential thought processes conspiracists employ, people who 
believe in one conspiracy theory are more likely to believe in others (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et 
al., 2016). Belief in paranormal or supernatural events is also positively related to both 
conspiracism and the tendency to engage in magical thinking (Swami et al., 2016). These same 
authors found that belief in conspiracies was related to two components of schizotypal 
personality. Thus, they propose that conspiracy theories can be thought of as a subset of 
anomalous beliefs, akin to paranormal beliefs or magical ideation.  
Magical ideation is the belief that certain events which cannot logically be related are in fact 
causal (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq (the 
precursor to ISIS) from 2004 to 2006, said, “we perform jihad here while our eyes are upon al-
Quds. We fight here, while our goal is Rome with good expectations concerning Allah that He 
makes us the keys for the Prophetic good tidings and Godly decrees” (“Dabiq: The failed 
crusade,” 2014, pg. 4). al-Quds refers to Jerusalem, and the remaining refers to the apocalyptic 
ideology of ISIS. They believe that in sparking a sectarian war in the Middle East and drawing in 
Western nations, they will engender a confrontation in the Syrian town of Dabiq, which was 
prophesized to be the site of the final battle between good and evil in the Hadtih. This ideology 
is not auxiliary to ISIS, but is rather its main point, and al-Zarqawi, the ideological forefather of 
ISIS ensured that this message permeated through to the rank-and-file of the entire group (Lister, 
2015; Warrick, 2016). 
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People who believe in CTs often endorse multiple conflicting narratives, with seemingly 
little recognition of the dissonance between them. Wood et al. (2012) found that the more 
strongly people believe in conspiracy theories, the more likely they are to endorse a 
simultaneously conflicting narrative of events. Participants who believed that Princess Diana 
faked her own death were also more likely to believe that she had been murdered. Participants 
who more strongly endorsed the conspiracy theory that Osama bin Laden was dead before the 
Navy SEALs raid which killed him were also more likely to believe that he was still alive. In the 
endorsement of conflicting conspiracy theories, people hold contradictory narratives at the same 
time by supporting an overarching belief in governmental malfeasance rather than an explicit 
endorsement of the individual narratives (Wood et al., 2012). Wood and his colleagues argue that 
the local narratives are not what people focus on, but rather the message behind the narratives, 
and how that assimilates into their particular worldview.  
Significance Quest 
The use of grievances to recruit individuals to join radical violent extremist groups 
activates significance quest, or the desire to feel that one’s life has meaning (Kruglanski et al., 
2009). Engaging in extreme actions that violate the instinctual need for survival, such as suicide 
bombing, requires commitment to a cause, the assurance that the action will have its intended 
consequences, and a perceived lack of other options for achieving the same goal (Dugas & 
Kruglanski, 2014; Kruglanski et al., 2014). Individuals with extreme beliefs, such as the desire 
for an Islamic state ruled by a successor to the prophet Muhammad (i.e., an Islamic caliphate), 
but who believe that political institutions offer a means to this goal, will not engage in violence 
because plausible alternatives still exist for them. Thus, according to significance quest, 
radicalization is a matter of degrees, and there is a meaningful distinction between those who 
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merely have radical views and those who have radical views and engage in violent acts as a 
means for achieving their goals (Horgan, 2008; Mccauley & Moskalenko, 2017; Taylor & 
Horgan, 2001). 
Significance quest has received support from several experiments. Dugas et al. (2016) 
found that experimentally inducing loss of significance (LoS) caused participants to regain 
significance through self-sacrifice significantly more than those who did not experience a 
significance loss. This effect was particularly salient when significance loss occurred in domains 
important to the participants. Self-sacrificing behaviors resulted in greater feelings of 
significance restoration than simply engaging in pleasurable activities, indicating that self-
sacrifice is an integral part of significance restoration and that simply doing something 
pleasurable is not enough to regain lost meaning. Additional support for significance quest as a 
viable model of radicalization came from a field study of 1,496 ideologically-motivated crimes 
in the United States, which indicated that individuals who suffered a social or financial loss of 
significance were more likely to commit violent crimes than those who did not have a prior 
significance-damaging event (Jasko, LaFree, & Kruglanski, 2017). In other words, individuals 
who experienced significance loss were more likely to engage in violent behaviors, presumably 
to regain their lost significance through an act they believed would lead to more gains for their 
ideological cause. 
The process of moving from extreme beliefs to actions involves three steps: the activation 
of significance quest, the identification of terrorism or joining a RVE group as a means for 
achieving significance, and finally, a commitment shift towards the goal of significance and 
away from other goals (Kruglanski et al., 2014). The shift towards terrorism as the means to 
achieving a goal involves relative devaluation of other means and goals. Shah, Friedman, and 
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Kruglanski (2002) found that when participants focused on an important, rather than unimportant 
goal, they listed fewer alternative goals, indicating goal inhibition. Additionally, subliminally 
priming a focal goal led to both decreased recognition of alternative goals and increased 
inhibition of alternatives. This effect, known as goal shielding, has been found in both explicit 
and implicit studies of primary goal commitment, and leads to devaluation of alternative goals 
relative to the focal goal(s).  
Significance quest activation can come from three places: the opportunity to gain 
significance through action, the restoration of loss of significance, and the prevention of the 
potential loss of significance that would come from inaction (Dugas & Kruglanski, 2014). 
Radical violent extremist organizations encourage prospective members to view current events 
as requiring action and that not doing so is antithetical to Islam (Winkler, El Damanhoury, 
Dicker, & Lemieux, 2016). Jihadi organizations argue that it is the duty of all Muslims to fight 
against Western hegemony in the region. Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the deceased spokesman 
of ISIS said:  
The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being 
nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their 
long slumber in the darkness of neglect – the time has come for them to rise (“Dabiq: The 
return of Khilafah,” 2014, pg. 8).  
ISIS explicitly implores potential recruits to view themselves as victims of injustice, to view 
inaction as continued humiliation, and to consider violence as the only way to regain lost stature. 
Need for Closure and the Significance Quest 
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The first stage of significance quest, its activation, is likely to be most salient for new 
recruits, rather than extant group members, and has been found to lead to RVE through the 
mechanism of need for cognitive closure (Webber et al., 2017). Need for cognitive closure 
(NFCC) is the intolerance of ambiguity, and the desire to possess an answer, any answer, to a 
question without thinking about the decision (Kruglanski, 1990; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
Activating significance quest can arise from personal or group loss, and a field study of 
individuals who committed politically-motivated crimes found that those who suffered financial 
setbacks and social detachment were significantly more likely to engage in violent acts compared 
to those who had not suffered significance-threatening events (Jasko et al., 2017). The activation 
of threat to significance presumably led these individuals to seek redress, which they found in 
extremist ideology and later, in political violence to further their group’s goals. 
Two mechanisms underlie how NFCC influences individual and group processes: 
urgency and permanence (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Urgency refers to the need to “seize” on 
an answer quickly, whereas permanence is the need to “freeze” on the answer, and thus not 
engage in hypothesis generation and validation again. When time pressure is heightened, NFCC 
increases, and individuals are more likely to seize and freeze on an answer without generating 
alternative hypotheses (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). The fewer hypotheses generated, the fewer plausible alternatives there may 
seem to be, which in turn leads to more confidence in the initial judgment (Kelley, 1973).  
Time pressure is a consistent theme in RVE propaganda, and one of ISIS’s tenets is the 
urgent need to engage in jihad to engender the end times.  
The seriousness and attention given to the commands of Allah and the need to fulfill 
them, as well as the sense of urgency and haste in fulfilling them is a means of strength 
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that can push a Muslim beyond hesitation and cause him to carry out the most difficult of 
tasks in the path of Allah. May Allah grant us these qualities, strengthen us, and keep us 
firm on His path (Islamic State, 2015a; pg. 9).  
The thrust of the article from which this quote appears is that waging war on the enemies of the 
Islamic State, particularly in Syria, will bring about the apocalypse as prophesied by 
Muhammad, but that joining the fight needs to be done quickly and without hesitation. 
Loss of significance has been found to increase the likelihood of self-sacrifice to regain 
lost self-worth in extremists and non-extremists alike (Dugas et al., 2016). Additionally, LoS 
significantly predicts engagement in RVE through the mechanism of NFCC (Webber et al., 
2017). Significance loss leads to a discrepancy between actual and desired states, which in turn 
enhances the appeal of closure and a desire for certainty. Indeed, in field studies with two 
samples of jailed terrorists, Webber and colleagues (2017) found a relationship between LoS and 
NFCC, which was in turn related to support for extremism, including suicide bombings and 
armed jihad. In addition, experimentally manipulating LoS led to high NFCC, which then led to 
endorsement of more extreme beliefs. Extremist groups are adept at exploiting this desire for an 
answer because the CTs they disseminate provide a rigid, Manichean worldview that offers easy 
solutions and clear strategies for restoring self-worth (Kruglanski et al., 2009). 
A clear example of this rigid worldview comes from an issue of Dabiq, the Islamic 
State’s magazine. “Everyone who opposes this goal or stands in the path of this goal is an enemy 
for us and a target for our swords, whatever his name may be and whatever his lineage may be. 
We have a religion that Allah revealed to be a scale and a judge. Its statement is decisive and its 
judgment is not amusement. It is the kinship between us and the people, for our scales – by 
Allah’s grace – are divine, our laws are Qur’anic, and our judgments are upon the prophetic 
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tradition” (“Dabiq: Shari’ah alone will rule Africa,” 2015, pg. 3). According to this passage, 
those who do not fully support ISIS are its enemies and a legitimate target for violence. There is 
no grey area: people are either with or against ISIS.  
Propaganda and the Extremist Narrative 
The potential for large gains in significance is likewise advertised by extremist groups in 
their propaganda. Rhetoric describing ISIS’s members as conquering heroes is often employed to 
place historical import on its mission (e.g., “The Muslims today have a loud, thundering 
statement, and possess heavy boots. They have a statement to make that will cause the world to 
hear and understand the meaning of terrorism, and boots that will trample the idol of nationalism, 
destroy the idol of democracy, and uncover its deviant nature.”; “Dabiq: The return of Khilafah,” 
2014, pg. 8). Engaging in terrorist acts allows individuals to transcend their otherwise normal 
lives and engage in historically-important actions, thereby increasing their personal significance. 
Anomie, or distrust of state and government institutions (Durkheim, 1893), is another 
mechanism through which people suffer significance loss (Kruglanski et al., 2014), and is also 
related to conspiratorial thinking. Individuals with stronger beliefs in conspiracy theories report 
significantly higher levels of anomie than those with attenuated beliefs in CTs (Abalakina-Paap, 
Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999). The propaganda ISIS employs explicitly denounces nation-
states as illegitimate and unable to provide true governance in accordance with their 
interpretation of the Quran. In an article addressing the Ummah, or all the members of the 
Muslim faith, and referring to Western governments, ISIS states:  
For they have always known that you are the severest of people in enmity to them, as 
well as the most dangerous of them against the little Jewish state and their agents, equally 
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from the apostate governments in the Gulf and those in the region…They have thrust 
their claws into the Ummah’s body for centuries, so it is time that those claws are pulled 
out and those hands are severed, by the permission of Allah, through iman [faith], 
steadfastness, reliance, patience, and the determination of the sons of the Khilafah [the 
caliphate], inshaallah [if Allah wills it] (“Rumiyah: The ruling of the belligerent 
Christians,” 2017, pg. 31).  
The governments of Israel, the West, and Middle Eastern allies are accused of intentionally 
harming the worldwide Muslim community, which is a direct instance of ISIS attempting to 
instill the idea that these states have failed their Muslim citizens. 
The relationship between significance arousal, conspiracy theories and extremist 
propaganda is not limited to anomie. Ontological insecurity, or the denial of reality as truth, may 
be a cause of beliefs in conspiracy theories as well (Aupers, 2012). Aupers (2012) argued that 
conspiracism is a natural byproduct of modernity and its concomitant ontological insecurity as 
well as a reaction to the public debates among scientists regarding their fields of study. The 
Enlightenment and the accompanying skepticism of authority, which led to the modern scientific 
method, also led to growth in the prevalence of conspiracy theories, or at least the likelihood that 
conspiracies will be believed. Recent research has found that ontological insecurity and anomie 
are related to distrust of scientific institutions and methods, mainstream narratives of events, and 
endorsement of conspiracy theories (Achterberg, de Koster, & van der Waal, 2017; Raab, 
Ortlieb, Auer, Guthmann, & Carbon, 2013; van der Tempel & Alcock, 2015) 
Moving from significance arousal to identification of terrorism as a means for achieving 
significance requires three components: grievances, whether personal or group; a culprit for the 
grievances; and the belief that terrorism is the means for addressing the grievances wrought by 
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the culprits, and hence pursue significance restoration, gain, or maintenance (Dugas et al., 2016; 
Kruglanski et al., 2014). The CTs used in ISIS’s propaganda explicitly include all three 
components, and their calls to action are often directed to the entire Muslim community, rather 
than to extant members of terrorist groups only. 
Discussing the battle of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi insisted that 
American soldiers were Crusaders bent on destroying Islam at the behest of Israel (“a Christian 
seed planted by the Jews in a Magian land”; “Rumiyah: The Jihad in East Asia,” 2017, pg. 8) and 
that the appropriate response was unending war:  
O ummah of Islam! You have been wounded and defamed incessantly and your illnesses 
and ailment cannot be treated except by tawhid [belief in the oneness and supremacy of 
God], which is fastened to the banners of jihad. So, when will [you] make the correct 
decision to go forth and escape your executioner? The battles today will neither cease nor 
settle, and our Prophet truly loved that he not sit back, away from a detachment that went 
forth to fight for Allah’s cause. Rather, he kept making raids and waging jihad at all times 
(“Rumiyah: The Jihad in East Asia,” 2017, pg. 11).  
Al-Zarqawi calls for the ummah, rather than only current ISIS members, to engage in terrorism 
in response to grievances. In this way, potential recruits are moved through the process from 
significance arousal to identification of terrorism as a means for significance. 
Once terrorism is identified as a means for significance quest, the degree of radicalization 
depends on the commitment shift to terrorism and the suppression or inhibition of alternative 
goals or means (Kruglanski et al., 2014). The higher the goal commitment to significance quest 
through terrorism and the lower the commitment to alternative goals, the more radicalized an 
CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND EXTREMISM 16 
individual is. Alternative goals may include the value of individual rights and freedoms, or 
religious or societal prohibitions against murder or violence as a means for achieving goals. This 
shift can occur independently, in groups, or through a combination of the two. Within groups, a 
collective reality can be created through collective cognitive closure, which may enhance the 
salience and commitment to the focal goal to the exclusion of other alternatives (Dugas & 
Kruglanski, 2018). 
Conspiracism and Radical Violent Extremism 
Extremist groups from across the ideological spectrum employ CTs to both recruit new 
members and sustain current membership. Bartlett and Miller (2010) conducted a qualitative 
content analysis of various extremist groups’ communications and found that all of those studied 
espouse some form of conspiracism. The most common conspiracy theory, one that cut across 
the political spectrum, was that of a Zionist cabal secretly controlling the world’s events. Neo-
Nazi groups and AQ promoted similarly anti-Semitic conspiracies despite having conflicting 
organizational goals. Indeed, in 2005, August Kreis, the newly-appointed leader of the Aryan 
Nation, invited AQ to join an anti-Zionist, anti-government coalition with the Aryan Nation 
(Schuster, 2005). Although Bartlett and Miller (2010) provided valuable insight into the types of 
conspiracies promulgated by violent extremist groups, their report lacked rigorous quantitative 
analyses of terrorist communications. Additionally, with the advent of ISIS and their 
sophisticated media arm, more English-language resources are available for analysis. 
Much of the research on conspiracies has been conducted in the Western world, but Gray 
(2010) argues that conspiracism in the Middle East is of a different kind and should be treated as 
such. The Middle East has a long history of involvement in actual conspiracies by the Western 
world, which may fuel a propensity to believe in far-fetched theories in the present day 
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(Mansfield, 1991). One of the rallying cries of terrorist groups in the Arab world is the Christian 
Crusades of the 11th century in which European Christians attempted to wrest control of modern 
Israel from its Muslim inhabitants (e.g., “Dabiq: The failed crusade,” 2014, “Dabiq: The return 
of Khilafah,” 2014).  
More recent conspiracies abound in the Middle East. The Sykes-Picot agreement was a treaty 
made in secret by the Great Powers of World War I to divide the Middle East between them, 
which they did with little regard to religious, ethnic, or tribal boundaries (Erlich, 2014). 
According to Salafi terrorist groups, the only viable configuration of society is a Muslim 
caliphate, a borderless community which encompasses the ummah, or the community of 
believers (Sageman, 2004). Nation-states themselves are viewed as illegitimate by Salafist 
terrorist groups, but that the Sykes-Picot agreement was completed in secrecy and resulted in 
authoritarian, tribally-mixed states, with little local input, only added to the sense of their 
illegitimacy (Mansfield, 1991; Warrick, 2016).  
In much of ISIS’s propaganda, explicit references to the Sykes-Picot agreement are often 
made. For example, Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi said,  
We do not perform jihad here for a fistful of dirt or an illusory border drawn up by Sykes and 
Picot. Similarly, we do not perform jihad for a Western taghut to take the place of an Arab 
taghut. Rather our jihad is loftier and more superior. We perform jihad so that Allah’s word 
becomes supreme and that the religion becomes completely for Allah. And [we] fight them 
until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah (“Dabiq: Shari’ah alone 
will rule Africa,” 2015, pg. 3). 
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“Taghut” refers to governments that do not act in accordance with ISIS’s worldview, or, as ISIS 
believes, in a manner consistent with Islamic scriptures, whereas “fitnah” refers to dissension 
within the Muslim world generally, but historically refers to the original divide between Shia and 
Sunni Muslims (Lister, 2015). In this passage, al-Zarqawi states that the system of nation-states, 
particularly those whose borders were drawn in the Sykes-Picot agreement, are fabricated and 
thus illegitimate, and that one end goal of ISIS is to quell all dissension in the Islamic world. 
Past conspiracies play a role in recruitment by terrorist organizations, but according to 
Bartlett and Miller (2010), the most oft-cited reason for engaging in terrorism is the continued 
existence of Israel as a nation, and the way in which the country was established. The Arab-
Israeli conflict and the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 are particularly poignant for Muslims in the 
Middle East (Gray, 2010; Mansfield, 1991). Nasser, the leader of Egypt at the time, nationalized 
the Suez Canal, which was a main thoroughfare for European and American goods to the Middle 
East. In response, Britain and France colluded with Israel to wrest control of the canal back from 
Nasser and ultimately, depose him. Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula, which Egypt responded to 
militarily. Subsequently, Britain and France called for a cease-fire, which was ignored, and then 
invaded the peninsula to “enforce” the cessation. The true reason for the invasion, however, was 
control of the canal. Although Egypt maintained control of the canal, the prevailing sentiment 
among Arab countries was that the West was allied against them (Erlich, 2014; Kinzer, 2003; 
Lister, 2015). 
In addition to conspiracies from outside powers, citizens of Middle Eastern countries have 
often had their own rulers use conspiracies as a means for maintaining power. A recent iteration 
of this tendency came from Bashar al-Assad in Syria in (Lister, 2015). In the first few months of 
the 2011 Syrian Revolution, the protestors against the Syrian regime wanted genuine democratic 
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reform and an end to the state of emergency which gave police and the military broad powers 
over civilian life (Bakri, 2011; Shadid, 2011a, 2011b; Zoepf, 2011). Assad insisted to the outside 
world that the protestors were Islamic terrorists, despite ample evidence to the contrary 
(MacFarquhar, 2011; Slackman, 2011; Stack & Zoepf, 2011). To buttress his claim that his 
regime was a bulwark between the West and another Middle Eastern country sliding towards 
radicalization, he ordered the release of militant radicals from Sednaya prison, a notoriously 
harsh institution (Gutman, 2016; Sanda, Vela, & Maayeh, 2014). The radicals insinuated 
themselves into the protests, and along with extremists from Iraq, formed the backbone of what 
is ISIS today (Lister, 2015; Salloum, 2013). Assad fulfilled his own prophecy by releasing the 
very extremists he was purporting to fight and then smeared the entire protest movement with the 
brush of religious radicalization. Instances of governmental and institutional mendacity like these 
decrease trust of official narratives and increase the likelihood of belief in CTs (Allen, 2016; 
Rothstein, 2004). Bashar al-Assad, in temporarily, albeit artificially, bringing truth to his claims 
of Islamic radicalization among protestors, worsened the conflict and may have pushed more 
people to ascribe to CTs and radical propaganda. 
Conspiracy Theories and Significance Quest 
 To my knowledge, there has been no research conducted on the relationship between 
conspiracy theories and significance quest. However, connections have been made to similar 
mechanisms, including political extremism, anomie, and distrust in government narratives of 
events (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013; 
Goertzel, 1994; Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014; van Prooijen, Krouwel, & 
Pollet, 2016). Some political scientists argue that there is a typology of conspiracy believers: 
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individuals who are knowledgeable about politics but lacking in trust (i.e., those who display 
high levels of anomie) have the most fervent beliefs in CTs (Miller, Saunders, & Farhart, 2016). 
Anomie and general distrust in state institutions may lead to the emergence of the first 
stage of significance quest. This distrust fuels LoS and a discrepancy between perceived and 
desired states, which in turn leads to “awakening” significance quest and seeking significance-
increasing acts or ideologies (Dugas & Kruglanski, 2014). Anomie can lead to deindividuation, 
and joining a terrorist group can satisfy the needs that are not being met by the state or society at 
large, including the need for belongingness, self-esteem, and self-enhancement (Bates, 2010). 
 One of the most influential conceptualizations of conspiracy theories  holds that they are 
powerless people’s attempts to make sense of the world (Hofstader, 1965). This implies that 
beliefs in CTs are a result of powerlessness, not antecedent to it. However, research has found 
that stoking anxiety leads to a significant increase in beliefs in CTs, suggesting that, in situations 
of high stress, CTs function as a coping mechanism for dealing with anxiety (Grzesiak-Feldman, 
2013). Additionally, conspiracy beliefs cut across socioeconomic statuses (Goertzel, 1994), 
suggesting that economic powerlessness is not a necessary condition for CT beliefs. Recent 
research has indicated that individuals with more education are less inclined to believe in CTs, 
but this effect was mediated by subjective social class, feelings of powerlessness, and beliefs in 
simple answers to complex problems (van Prooijen, 2017). As with terrorism, belief in CTs cuts 
across socioeconomic and education levels. 
ISIS uses its propaganda to simultaneously invoke distrust in governments allied against 
it and to provide recruits with paths to significance:  
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The Turkish government today, by entering into an open war with the Islamic State, is 
only cutting its own throat with its own knife, slicing its own veins with its own hand, 
hanging itself with its own ropes, and wrecking its own house – and indeed, the weakest 
house is that of a spider. O soldiers of the Khilafah [Islamic State] in Turkey! O you 
whose path to performing hijrah [spiritual migration] to Dar al-Islam [Syria] has been 
blocked by the murtad [apostate], Turkish border patrol forces! You must strike the 
Turkish taghut [illegitimate government] and his murtad followers…Start with the imams 
of kufr [the supporters of the government] and the pillars of taghut therein. Attack the 
police, judges, and military. Attack the scholars of the taghut and the supporters of 
Erdogan’s [Turkey’s President] political party (AKP) as well as other murtad parties 
allied to him. And in the midst of your war against these people, do not forget to kill the 
citizens of Crusader nations wherever you find them. Make examples of them for those 
behind them to be terrorstruck [sic] and take revenge by killing them for the crimes 
perpetrated against your brothers (Islamic State, 2016; pg. 3). 
Individuals who wanted to join ISIS but were prevented from crossing into Syria are urged to 
regain their significance by attacking representatives of the Turkish government, which ISIS 
accuses of not being sufficiently Islamic, and thus, failing the ummah. 
Conspiracy Theories and Need for Cognitive Closure 
Heightened NFCC is also associated with increased acceptance of CTs (Swami et al., 2014), 
whereas artificially lowering NFCC diminishes beliefs in CTs (Leman & Cinnirella, 2013). In 
the context of ambiguous situations in which conspiratorial explanations are made salient, NFCC 
predicts belief in CTs, but not when conspiracies are unavailable or when the event has an 
official explanation (Marchlewska, Cichocka, & Kossowska, 2017). In other words, individuals 
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high in NFCC will “freeze” on a conspiratorial explanation when it is readily accessible and 
official explanations for the event are unknown. 
One component of NFCC is permanence striving, or is the desire for consistency in 
generalized knowledge, even if the situational specifics are inconsistent (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996). This allows individuals to accept information that confirms a general belief, without 
needing to generate and validate specific contextual hypotheses about each piece of information. 
This desire for consistency as a result of NFCC has been effectively primed by experimentally 
inducing time pressure (Chirumbolo, Livi, Mannetti, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski & 
Freund, 1983; Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998). For individuals with high NFCC, 
particular conspiracies may directly contradict each other, but the general message they purvey 
will be more important than the specifics of the theory. Wood et al. (2012) confirmed this in their 
findings that individuals with strong beliefs in a CT were more likely to believe a CT that 
contradicted it, as long as a given theory confirmed a previously-held, overarching belief about 
the world.  
The Current Study 
 The purpose of the current study is to determine if radical violent extremist groups are 
more likely to use conspiracy theories in their recruitment propaganda than non-violent radical 
groups and moderate groups. An additional aim is to determine whether the conspiracy theories 
published by RVE groups arouse significance quest through: need for cognitive closure, anomie, 
and explicit calls for violence. Thus, the following hypotheses are proposed: a.) RVE groups will 
use more CTs than non-violent and moderate groups and b.) the CTs used by RVE groups will be 
more likely to activate significance quest. The CTs used by RVE groups will be designed to 
activate significance quest through: b1) need for cognitive closure via time pressure, b2) anomie 
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 In order to test the hypotheses, propaganda from violent extremist, non-violent extremist, 
and moderate Islamic and right-wing organizations were compared (see Table 1). The Southern 
Poverty Law Center’s (SPLC) Hatewatch database (“www.hatewatch.org,” 2018) was used to 
find representative groups. This methodology has been used in previous research to identify 
groups with extremist affiliations (Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang, 2003), and resulted in 
identification of three violent right-wing groups and one non-violent right-wing group and their 
attendant publications. The neo-conservative wing of the Republican party was identified as a 
moderate alternative to the extremist groups, and the National Review, which is credited with 
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Table 1 
Groups, Affiliated Publications, and Dates of Publications 
 Radical violent extremism Non-violent radical extremism Moderate 
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The violent right-wing groups were: National Vanguard, National Socialist Movement 
(NSM), and Blood and Honour. Although each has different foundations and membership 
characteristics, all espouse a similarly violent Neo-Nazi worldview in which minorities, 
particularly, but not limited to, Jews, are deemed the root cause of societal problems 
(“www.hatewatch.org,” 2018). Each group has explicitly promoted violence in their literature, 
and have had members implicated in violence against minorities (Gerstenfeld et al., 2003; 
Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Parkin, Klein, Freilich, & Chermak, 2017; Whitsel, 2001). The 
National Vanguard publishes a magazine called The National Vanguard, whereas the NSM has 
two magazines: The National Socialist Movement and the now-defunct The Stormtrooper.  Blood 
and Honour published one field manual for potential recruits which was used. 
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Figure 1. Methodology steps. 
The non-violent right-wing extremist groups are affiliated with the alternative right (“alt-
right”) movement, a loose conglomeration of white nationalist groups, which are attempting to 
make their views more palatable in mainstream political discourse by publicly disavowing 
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violence (Hartzell, 2018; Michael, 2017). The phrase “alt-right” was coined by Richard Spencer, 
who has remained one of the leaders of the movement despite recent legal troubles (Michel, 
2018). One of the main policy positions of the alt-right is a White ethno-state, and members 
argue that this goal can be achieved without violence (Hartzell, 2018). The publications helmed 
by Richard Spencer, National Policy Institute and Radix, were used as representative of this 
group. In addition, Jared Taylor’s publication, The American Renaissance, and a blog named The 
Right Stuff were used. Taylor has been publishing The American Renaissance since the 1990’s, 
and is considered an ideological forefather to Spencer and others in the White nationalist 
movement (Florido, 2016; Nagle, 2017; Wilson, 2017). 
The violent jihadist groups used were ISIS and al-Qaida. Rumiyah, Dabiq, and the 
Islamic State Report were ISIS’s publications, and Inspire was the al-Qaida publication. Hizb ut-
Tahrir, an organization that promotes the formation of an Islamic caliphate through non-violent 
means (Baran, 2004; Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006) was used as representative of a non-
violent extremist group on the Islamic side. This group publishes two periodicals: Nussrah and 
Mukhtarat, both of which were used. The “control” groups to which we compared these 
extremist groups were: The Islamic Monthly, a publication focused on news and current affairs, 
and The National Review, a conservative periodical prominent in neoconservative policy circles. 
Of the publications identified for inclusion, two sources required web crawling to render 
usable documents: Radix and The Right Stuff. The R package, Rcrawler (Khalil, 2017) was used. 
This package crawls websites and downloads every linked page in HTML format to a local 
library, which can then be analyzed. The remainder of the publications offered magazines or 
other long format documents for download aimed at potential group members.  
Measures 
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To measure the frequency of CT use in publications, a list of common conspiracies was 
compiled based on previous research as well as from online forums affiliated with the groups of 
interest (see Appendix for complete list). There were five from Islamic groups, 14 from Right-
wing groups, five that are used by both groups, and a list of generic CTs that are common in non-
extremist circles. The researcher further broke down the conspiracy theories into common 
keywords, or engrams, which could be used in text analysis and data mining software packages.  
Sample conspiracy theories include that the West is engaging in a crusade against Islam, that 
national borders are illegitimate, and that there is a world-wide shadow government that secretly 
controls events behind the scenes.   
The only CT that had not been previously used in research is referred to as “Q,” “Q-
Anon,” or “the Storm,” and was relatively new, having emerged in October 2017 (Martineau, 
2017, 2018; Weeast, 2018). This CT posits that a high-level government operative or group of 
operatives, referred to by the code-name, “Q,” has access to sensitive material and will drop 
hints, referred to as “crumbs” by followers, on anonymous websites including 4chan, 8chan, and 
on the Deep and/or Dark Web. Collectively, the knowledge Q purportedly possesses is called 
“The Storm,” and includes, among other things, evidence that: a child sex-trafficking ring is 
being run by Democrats including Bill and Hillary Clinton, that Robert Mueller’s investigation 
into President Trump is in fact an investigation into the Clintons and former President Barack 
Obama, and that Donald Trump uncovered real collusion with Russia by Clinton and Obama and 
agreed to pretend to be under investigation so the true inquiry can proceed unimpeded (“/cbts/ - 
Calm before the storm,” 2017; “Q Anon - The storm,” 2018; Deschamps, 2017; Martineau, 2017, 
2018; Weeast, 2018). 
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 The initial list of 26 CTs was reduced to two per group through random selection. This 
was done given that each CT was to be coded manually as opposed to an automated process.  
Table 2 
Randomly Selected Conspiracy Theories Included in Analyses 
Conspiracy Theory Associated Group Engrams used 
Crusades Islamic Crusades, Christian Crusader, Crusader 
Nations 
The establishment of the 
caliphate will lead to 
apocalypse 
Islamic Khilafah, caliphate, apocalypse, malahim, 
end times 
Race War is imminent Far-Right White genocide, race war, race traitor, 
eugenics, 14 words, 1488 
New World Order Far-Right New World Order (NWO), shadow 
government, black helicopters, the 
octopus 
 
The text analysis package tidytext (Silge & Robinson, 2016) in the statistical analysis 
software R (R Core Team, 2018) and RStudio (RStudio Team, 2016) was used for data 
exploration and analysis, and SPSS was used for data analysis. The tidytext package reads 
documents into R and can then be used to manipulate the texts as “tibbles,” which are data 
frames with one variable per column, one case per row, and one instance per cell. The keywords 
for the conspiracy theories were entered into the text analysis packages, and when a “hit” was 
found, the sentence and paragraph in which it occurred was culled into a database. The paragraph 
thus, is the unit of analysis. Subsequently, each paragraph was coded according to the stated 
hypotheses (see Appendix B for complete coding scheme). Each paragraph received either a 
“one” or a “zero” for the presence or absence, respectively, of each component.  
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Table 3 
Variables in Coding Scheme 
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Interrater reliability 
ISIS and AQ’s propaganda resulted in a total of 1,038,540 words, 42,076 sentences, and 
3,736 paragraphs. After using the engrams described above, the text analysis software pulled 
50,162 mentions of the Crusades, which resulted in 604 paragraphs. The CT associated with the 
establishment of a global caliphate engendering the end times was mentioned 527 times in 263 
distinct paragraphs. See tables 4 and 5 for further breakdown of the sample. 
Table 4 
Sample Characteristics from Islamic Groups 
 ISIS/AQ Hizb ut-Tahrir Islamic Monthly 
Total words 1,038,540 1,533,264 726,213 
Total sentences 42,076 50,860 27,428 
Total paragraphs 3,736 4,948 2,617 
Crusades words 50,162 296 13 
Crusades paragraphs 604 220 12 
Apocalypse words 527 4,667 34 
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Table 5 
Sample Characteristics from Right-Wing Groups 
 Neo-Nazis Alt-Right National Review 
Total words 618,259 7,251,775 1,072,171 
Total sentences 25,278 327,870 50,401 
Total paragraphs 2,322 29,481 3,547 
NWO words 39 390 42 
NWO paragraphs 38 316 40 
Race war words 53 744 36 
Race war paragraphs 39 562 31 
 
Once the paragraphs associated with the randomly selected CTs were compiled, two 
independent coders rated 27 randomly-selected paragraphs on the coding scheme to establish 
interrater reliability (IRR). Cohen’s kappa was then used to compute IRR. According to Viera 
and Garrett (2005), any rating above k = .60 is considered substantial agreement. Accordingly, 
there was substantial agreement between the two raters on the full scale, k = .791 (95% CI, .730 
to.852), p<.001. The questions regarding the presence or absence of a CT and which CT was 
present displayed almost perfect agreement, k = .922 (95% CI, .820 to 1.00), p<.001. The 
questions regarding anomie displayed substantial agreement, k = .816 (95% CI, .734 to .898), 
p<.001. Likewise, the significance quest-related questions displayed substantial 
agreement, k=.758 (95% CI, .638 to .878). 
Need for cognitive closure was the most troublesome construct, as the initial 27 articles 
resulted in a k slightly below .60, k = .578, p<.001. After meeting to discuss the discrepancies, 20 
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additional passages were assigned to both raters. Moderate agreement was found, k = .600 (95% 
CI, .445 to .755), p<.001. The estimated reliability of need for cognitive closure is at the cutoff 
for acceptable agreement (Viera and Garrett, 2005), but because the 95% confidence interval 
includes reliability estimates below this level, results regarding need for cognitive closure should 
be interpreted with caution. Future researchers should strive to achieve higher agreement on this 
dimension.  
Power analysis of a chi-squared test with five degrees of freedom and a small to moderate 
effect size, w = .30, indicated that a total sample of 221 was required, or approximately 37 from 
each group (i.e., ISIS/AQ, Hizb, The Islamic Monthly, Neo-Nazis, Alt-right, and 
Neoconservatives). Five degrees of freedom was used because this is the maximum degrees of 
freedom in any given analysis and would result in the largest minimum sample size required to 
find an effect. As a result, 50 paragraphs from each group were randomly selected for inclusion 
into the analysis. The final sample included 283 passages given that The Islamic Monthly pulling 
only 32 total passages. Of the paragraphs initially included, 13 were replaced because of 
incomplete information. The incomplete passages were comprised of the HTML and PHP coding 
language used in the websites from which they were pulled and did not provide any text for 
coding. Replacement paragraphs included randomly selected paragraphs from the primary 
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Table 6 
CTs Used in Analysis 
 CT from engram 
 
Apocalypse Crusades NWO Race War Total 
ISIS/AQ 17 33 0 0 50 
Hizb ut-Tahrir 47 3 0 0 50 
Islamic Monthly 21 11 0 0 32 
Neo-Nazis 0 0 23 29 52 
Alt-Right 0 0 18 31 49 
Neoconservatives 0 0 28 22 50 
Total 85 47 69 82 283 
 
Analysis 
The analysis of the stated hypotheses involved comparing the frequency of the presence 
(or absence) of identified conspiracy theories in propaganda materials of extremist groups. The 
rate of conspiracy theory use was compared across violent and less violent extremist groups. 
Independent raters coded for the use of time pressure (Yes vs. No), the presence of anomie (Yes 
vs. No), and the promotion of violence (Yes vs. No). Chi-squared tests of independence were 
used to analyze the data. In order to conduct post-hoc comparisons, the adjusted standardized 
residual was used (Beasley & Schumacker, 1995). This statistic is a z-score based on the 
likelihood of group membership and can be used to determine the effect a given cell in a 
contingency table has on the total chi-squared statistic (MacDonald & Gardner, 2000). Using this 
statistic instead of conducting multiple 2 x 2 post-hoc comparisons lowers the risk of Type I 
errors. 
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The z-scores used as critical values were determined using Sidak’s (1967) alpha 
correction: αnew = 1-(1-αold)1/m, where m is the number of cells in a given comparison. For a 3 x 2 
contingency table, the critical value is Z = 2.42, α = 0.0085, whereas a 4 x 2 table has a critical 
value of Z = 2.49, α = .0064. A 6 x 2 contingency table has a critical value of Z = 2.62, α= .0042. 
A positive adjusted residual higher than the critical value indicates that the row by column 
frequency in that cell is significantly more likely than would be expected by chance. A negative 
residual indicates the opposite: that the number of occurrences is significantly lower than would 
be expected by chance. 
Additionally, two effect sizes were computed: Cramer’s Φ for 2 x 2 contingency tables 
and Cramer’s V for contingency tables larger than 2 x 2. Both are considered “strength-of-
association” indices and estimate the variance shared by two or more variables (Ferguson, 2009). 
Cramer’s Φ can range from -1 to 1, and can be interpreted similarly to Pearson’s r (Rodgers & 
Nicewander, 1988). In this case, the sign corresponds to whether the association is strongest on  
Table 7 
Critical Values for Contingency Tables of Different Independent Variables 
Contingency Table Z critical value  α level Independent Variables 
3 x 2  2.42 .0085 Extremism (3 levels) 
4 x 2 2.49 .0064 Group membership – violent passages 
(4 levels) 
6 x 2 2.69 .0042 Group membership (6 levels) 
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the diagonal (positive sign) or the off-diagonal (negative sign). Cramer’s V ranges from zero to 
one. In both cases an absolute value of .2 is considered a small effect size, an absolute value of .5 
a moderate effect, and absolute values of .8 and above a strong effect (Cohen, 1992; Ferguson, 
2009). 
Results 
 Pearson chi-squared tests of independence were conducted to determine the differences 
among RVE groups, non-violent extremist groups, and moderate groups in terms of the 
hypotheses listed above. All of the statistics and effect sizes for the analyses are listed in Table 8. 
Conspiracy Theory Use 
In order to test the hypothesis that RVE groups would use more CTs in their propaganda than 
non-violent and moderate groups, a 3 x 2 chi-square was run. Results indicated that there were 
significant differences among the levels of extremism in propensity of CT use,   
χ2 (2, N = 283) = 109.279, p < .005, V = .621. The most significant contribution to the chi-
squared statistic came from the moderate groups (Islamic Monthly and neoconservatives), such 
that significantly fewer passages contained CTs (12.2%) than expected Z = -10.30, α < .0001. 
The RVE groups and non-violent extremist groups made significant contributions to the chi-
squared as well, but in the opposite direction. Radical violent extremist groups used CTs 
significantly more often than expected (84.3% of the time), Z = 6.4, α < .0001, as did non-violent 
extremist groups (42.9% of the time), Z = 3.4, p = .0003. These results are in line with the 
hypothesis in that RVE groups used CTs more often than non-violent groups, who used them 
more often than moderate groups. 
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Table 8 
Chi-Squared Statistics and Effect Sizes Across Levels of Extremism 
 




   
























































74.145 .512  
Note. All chi-squared values significant at the p < .005 level. 
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To examine if these effects were related to ideological background (Islamic or Right-
wing), explicit promotion of violence, or extremism, three additional 2 x 2 chi-squared tests were 
conducted. In the first, ideology was found to be unrelated to the presence of CTs,   
χ2 (1, N = 283) = 0.008, p = .930. This indicates that Right-Wing and Islamic groups were 
equally likely to use CTs. The second found that violent ideology was significantly related to CT 
use, χ2 (1, N = 283) = 41.15, p < .005, Φ = -.381. The negative sign on the Φ coefficient indicates 
that the data are heavily weighted on the off-diagonals, which in this contingency table 
corresponds to the “violent group with CTs present” cell (84.3% of the violent passages) and the 
“non-violent group with CTs absent” cell (54.7% of the non-violent passages). In other words, in 
line with the hypotheses, violent groups were significantly more likely than non-violent groups 
to use CTs in their propaganda.  
Additionally, extremist groups were significantly more likely to use CTs than moderate 
groups, χ2 (1, N = 283) = 106.48, p < .001, Φ = -.613. The negative Φ coefficient indicates that 
more data are in the cells: “extremist group with CT present” (78.6% of the extremist passages 
and 94.0% of the CTs) and “moderate group without CTs” (87.8% of the moderate passages and 
62.6% of the non-CT passages). RVE groups were significantly more likely than non-violent 
groups and moderate groups to use CTs, and this variance is explained by the use of violence and 
the level of extremism, regardless of ideology. Violence and extreme beliefs explain the 
difference in the use of CTs between these groups, whereas ideology does not. 
In order to determine if these effects were being driven by a single group, a 6 x 2 (group 
x CT) chi-squared test was conducted. There were significant differences between groups in the 
prevalence of CTs in their publications, χ2 (5, N = 283) = 110.61, p < .001, V = .625, but this 
alone does not indicate the magnitude nor direction of influence of individual groups. Adjusted 
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standardized residuals allow for the individual contributions of each group to be examined. Any 
adjusted residual above an absolute value of Z = 2.62 indicates that the observed count in the cell 
is significantly different than would have been expected by chance. The further from zero the Z 
value is, the stronger that cell’s effect on the overall chi-squared statistic.  
Of the six groups, only one, Hizb ut-Tahrir, did not have a significant effect on whether 
CTs depended on group membership, Z = 1.4, p = .081. The most influential groups were the 
moderates: Islamic Monthly and Neoconservatives (Z = -6.1, α < .0001 and Z = -7.2, α < .0001, 
respectively). The negative Z value indicates that these groups were significantly less likely than 
expected to have CTs present in their publications. Neo-Nazis and ISIS/AQ also had significant 
individual effects (Z = 4.4, α < .0001 and Z = 3.6, α = .0002, respectively), such that these groups 
were significantly more likely to publish CTs than would be expected by chance. Likewise, the 
Alt-Right had a significant impact on the overall group differences, Z = 2.9, α = .002, but was 
less influential than any other group except for Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
Table 9 
Prevalence of CTs Across Publications 
 CT Present n(%) Adjusted Residual 
ISIS/AQ 41 (82.0%) 3.6* 
Hizb ut-Tahrir 34 (68.0%) 1.4 
Islamic Monthly 3 (9.4%) -6.1* 
Neo-Nazis 45 (86.5%) 4.4* 
Alt-Right 38 (77.6%) 2.9* 
Neoconservatives 7 (14.0%) -7.2* 
*Significant at the α = .0004 level 
Need for Cognitive Closure  
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As with the prevalence of CTs in publications, the first analysis was to determine whether 
RVE groups were more likely than non-violent extremist groups and moderate groups to use 
time pressure to elicit NFCC. A 3 x 2 chi-squared test (extremism x NFCC) indicated that there 
were significant differences between the three groups in the use of time pressure,  
χ2 (2, N = 283) = 48.026, p < .001, V = .412. Adjusted standard residuals revealed that all three 
groups had significant effects on the between-group differences. Moderates had the largest 
effect, Z = -6.9, α < .0001, followed by RVE groups, Z = 3.8, α = .0001, and non-violent 
extremists, Z = 2.8, α = .0026. Thus, moderates were significantly less likely to use time pressure 
in their publications than would be expected by chance, whereas RVE groups and non-violent 
extremists were significantly more likely than that which would be expected by chance. As 
predicted, the use of NFCC was greater in RVE groups than non-violent extremist groups and 
moderate groups. 
Table 10 
Prevalence of NFCC Across Levels of Extremism 
 NFCC Present n(%) Adjusted Residual 
RVE 51 (50.0%) 3.8* 
Non-violent extremists 46 (46.5%) 2.8* 
Moderates 4 (4.9%) -6.9* 
*Significant at α < .009 level 
 To parse where these differences emerged, three additional 2 x 2 chi-squared tests were 
conducted: ideology x NFCC, violence x NFCC, and extremism x NFCC. Groups with Islamic 
ideologies were significantly more likely to use time pressure in their CTs than those on the 
Right-wing, χ2 (1, N = 283) = 10.279, p = .001, Φ = -.191. This is a small effect size, but 
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significant nonetheless and indicates that time pressure is more prominent among Islamic groups 
(45.5% of Islamic passages) than among Right-wing groups (27.2% of Right-wing passages). 
Additionally, the violent groups were significantly more likely to employ time pressure than the 
non-violent groups in this sample, χ2 (1, N = 283) = 14.231, p < .001, Φ = -.224. Once again, the 
effect size is small, but does mean that violent groups were more likely to use time pressure to 
elicit NFCC (50.0% of violent passages) than non-violent groups (27.6% of passages). 
 At first glance, the largest effect on whether a group uses time pressure seemed to be the 
extremism of the group. Extremist groups were significantly more likely than moderate groups to 
use time pressure to elicit NFCC, χ2 (1, N = 283) = 47.752, p < .005, Φ = -.411. However, 
examination of the observed frequencies indicate that this effect is not because extremist groups 
use time pressure over and above violent groups or Islamic groups, but rather that moderate 
groups rarely used time pressure. Indeed, moderate groups elicited NFCC only 4.9% of the time, 
whereas extremist groups used time pressure in their communication 48.3% of the time, a 
percentage comparable to violent groups (50.0%) and Islamic groups (45.5%). Thus, the 
comparably larger effect size of extremism is simply an artifact of the comparison group. 
Collectively, the results surrounding NFCC suggest that groups with violent, extremist, Islamic 
ideologies are the most likely to elicit NFCC through the use of time pressure, although the 
effect size is small. 
 To determine whether group membership was related to NFCC, a 6 x 2 chi-squared test 
was conducted. Results indicated that there were significant differences between groups in the 
prevalence of NFCC, χ2 (5, N = 283) = 57.236, p < .005, V = .450. The most influential group 
was the Neoconservatives, who were significantly less likely to elicit NFCC through time 
pressure than would be expected under the null hypothesis, Z = -5.5, α < .0001. Unexpectedly, 
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Hizb ut-Tahrir’s effect on group differences, Z = 4.0, α < .0001, was stronger than ISIS and 
AQ’s, Z = 3.0, p = .001. Both groups were significantly more likely than chance to elicit NFCC 
in their publications, but, in this case, in the opposite order than expected. The non-violent 
extremist group contributed more strongly to the group differences than the RVE groups, 
meaning that they were more likely to use NFCC than RVE groups.  Another surprising finding 
is that neither Neo-Nazis, Z = 1.7 α = .045, nor the Alt-right, Z = 0.5, α = .308, contributed 
significantly to differences between the groups, as neither group’s residual was higher than the 
critical value of Z = 2.62. This indicates that the Neo-Nazis and Alt-right were no more likely 
than chance to use NFCC in their publications, and confirms the earlier findings surrounding 
ideology and time pressure. 
Anomie  
The hypothesis that anomie would be greatest among violent extremists was tested using 
a 3 x 2 chi-squared test. There were significant differences in elicitation of mistrust among RVE 
groups, non-violent extremist groups, and moderate groups, χ2 (2, N = 283) = 72.581, p < .005,  
V = .510. Adjusted residuals indicate the moderate groups contributed the most to the 
differences, Z = -8.5, α < .0001, followed by non-violent extremists, Z = 4.6, α < .0001, and RVE 
groups, Z = 3.5, p = .0002. The moderate groups’ lack of anomie elicitation is in line with the 
hypothesis, but the fact that non-violent extremists were more likely to use anomie than RVE 
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Table 11 
Presence of Anomie Across Levels of Extremism 
 Anomie Present n(%) Adjusted Residual 
RVE 67 (65.7%) 3.5* 
Non-violent extremists 70 (70.7%) 4.6* 
Moderates 10 (12.2%) -8.5* 
*Significant at α < .009 
 To determine where these differences came from, three additional 2 x 2 chi-squared tests 
were conducted. Islamic and Right-wing groups were equally likely to use their publications to 
elicit mistrust of institutions, χ2 (1, N = 283) = 0.117, p = .732. However, violent groups were 
significantly more likely than non-violent groups to elicit anomie, χ2 (1, N = 283) = 12.066,  
p = .001, Φ = -.206, and extremist groups were significantly more likely than non-extremist 
groups to elicit anomie, χ2 (1, N = 283) = 73.073, p < .005, Φ = -.508. This result is interesting 
considering the findings from the initial analysis indicating that non-violent extremist groups 
were more likely than RVE groups to elicit anomie but can be explained by the pull in the 
opposite direction from the moderate groups. In other words, although non-violent extremist 
groups were more likely than RVE groups to use their publications to elicit distrust of 
mainstream institutions, the effect was cancelled out by the fact that moderate groups were 
significantly more likely than chance to avoid anomie. 
 The presence of anomie and its relation to group membership was then tested using a 6 x 
2 chi-squared (see Table 8). There were significant differences among groups in the elicitation of 
anomie, χ2 (5, N = 283) = 73.88, p < .005, V = .511. The largest absolute contributions to this 
difference came from Neoconservatives and the Islamic Monthly (Z = -5.9, α < .0001 and  
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Z = -5.1, α < .0001, respectively) followed by the Alt-right and Hizb ut-Tahrir (Z = 3.0,   
α = .0014 and Z = 2.8, α = .0026, respectively). The two moderate groups were significantly less 
likely than chance to elicit anomie in their publications, whereas the two non-violent extremist 
groups were significantly more likely than chance to do so. Interestingly, neither of the RVE 
groups – ISIS/AQ and Neo-Nazis – contributed significantly to the difference in anomie across 
groups. Both groups’ residual values were below the critical value of Z = 2.62, meaning that 
neither violent extremist group was significantly more likely to use anomie than that which 
would be predicted by chance. 
Table 12 
Prevalence of Anomie Across Groups 
 Anomie Present n(%) Adjusted Residual 
ISIS/AQ 32 (64.0%) 1.9 
Hizb ut-Tahrir 35 (70.0%) 2.8* 
Islamic Monthly 3 (9.4%) -5.1* 
Neo-Nazis 35 (67.3%) 2.5 
Alt-Right 35 (71.4%) 3.0* 
Neoconservatives 7 (14.0%) -5.9* 
*Significant α < .004 level 
Violence  
A 6 x 2 chi-squared test was conducted to determine whether RVE groups were more 
likely than non-violent extremist groups and moderate groups to use violence as a means for 
activating significance quest. In support of grouping ISIS, AQ, and Neo-Nazis as RVE groups, 
there were significant group differences in whether explicit promotion of violence was present, 
χ2 (5, N = 283) = 80.533, p < .005, V = .533. Only ISIS/AQ and Neo-Nazis were significantly 
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more likely than chance to promote violence in their publications (Z = 7.0, α < .0001 and Z = 3.6, 
α = .0002, respectively). Neoconservatives, Z = -3.9, α < .0001, the Alt-right, Z = -3.1, α = .001, 
and the Islamic Monthly, Z = -3.0, α = .001, were significantly less likely to use violence in their 
publications than would have been expected by chance, whereas Hizb ut-Tahrir was not 
significantly different from chance, Z = -1.2, α = .115. To ensure that ISIS/AQ and Neo-Nazis, 
the groups classified as RVE, were not statistically different from each other in promoting 
violence, a 2 x 2 chi-square test was conducted. This revealed that there was no significant 
difference between these groups in terms of the use of violent passages, χ2 (1, N = 102) = 3.147, 
p = .076. 
In order to test whether violence was used to activate significance quest, the data file was 
split along whether a passage was explicitly violent or not and then analyzed for the presence of 
significance gain, significance restoration, significance maintenance, and loss of significance. A 
total of 57 passages had explicit calls for violence. Forty-eight of the passages were from RVE 
groups whereas nine were from non-violent extremist groups. Because none of the moderate 
groups promoted violence in any of their passages, they are excluded from the violent passage 
group. Thus, the tests on violent passages were conducted to determine whether RVE groups 
were significantly more likely than non-violent extremist groups to promote significance quest 
using violence. The non-violent passages have the same number of categories as the preceding 
analyses, but with reduced sample size. 
Significance gain. For violent passages, a 2 x 2 chi-square test was conducted on 
extremism and significance gain. No significant differences in the likelihood of promoting 
significance gain in violent passages emerged between these groups, χ2 (1, N = 57) = 1.811,  
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p = .178. In the non-violent passages, however, significant group differences emerged in the 
likelihood to promote significance gain, χ2 (2, N = 226) = 20.494, p < .005, V = .301. Contrary to 
expectations, RVE groups were not significantly more likely than chance to promote significance 
gain, Z = 2.1, α = .018 (the adjusted critical value for a 3 x 2 chi-squared is Z = 2.42). Non-
violent extremists were significantly more likely than chance to promote significant gain in non-
violent passages, Z = 2.6, p = .005, whereas moderate groups were significantly less likely than 
chance to promote significance gain in non-violent passages, Z = -4.5, α < .0001.  
Ideologically, Islamic groups were significantly more likely than Right-wing groups to 
promote significance gain in both violent passages, χ2 (1, N = 57) = 6.768, p = .009, Φ = -.345, 
and non-violent passages, χ2 (1, N = 226) = 11.537, p = .001, Φ = -.226. To further parse where 
these differences are, a 4 x 2 chi-squared test was conducted on group membership and 
significance gain in violent passages and a 6 x 2 chi-squared test was conducted on the non-
violent passages. In both analyses, Fisher’s exact test was used because more than one cell had 
expected counts fewer than five. 
 In the violent passages, there were significant differences between groups in the 
likelihood of promoting significance gain, Fisher’s = 11.503, p = .005, V = .429 such that IS/AQ 
was significantly more likely than chance to promote significance gain through violent action,   
Z = 3.2, α = .007. None of the other groups had a significant impact on the chi-squared statistic, 
although Neo-Nazis, Z = -2.4, α = .0082, fell just below the critical value for this chi-square test. 
However, this finding was opposite of the expected direction, as the negative sign indicates that 
violent passages in Neo-Nazi publications were less likely than chance to promote significance 
gain. In the non-violent passages, only Hizb ut-Tahrir was significantly more likely than chance 
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to promote significance gain, Z = 5.0, α < .0001, whereas Neoconservatives were significantly 
less likely than chance to do so, Z = -3.2, α = .0069. 
 Significance restoration. A 2 x 2 chi-squared test was conducted on extremism and 
significance restoration in the violent passages, whereas a 3 x 2 test was conducted on extremism 
in the non-violent passages. In the violent passages, non-violent extremists were significantly 
more likely than RVE groups to recommend action to restore lost significance,   
χ2 (1, N = 57) = 8.552, p = .003, Φ = .387. The same pattern emerged in the non-violent 
passages, χ2 (2, N = 226) = 31.947, p < .005, V = .376, such that non-violent extremists were 
significantly more likely than chance to promote significance restoration, Z = 5.7, α < .0001, 
whereas RVE groups and moderates were significantly less likely than chance to do so (Z = -2.5, 
α = .006 and Z = -3.6, α = .0002, respectively). 
 Group membership was then entered into the chi-squared tests to determine where the 
differences arose from. In both the violent and non-violent passages, more than two cells had 
expected counts less than five. Because of this, Fisher’s exact test was used. In violent passages, 
there were significant differences between groups in the likelihood of promoting significance 
restoration, Fisher’s = 10.892, p = .006, V = .452, but the only significant contributor to this test 
statistic was IS/AQ. They were significantly less likely than would be expected by chance to 
promote significance restoration in violent passages, Z = -2.7, α = .0035. Hizb ut-Tahrir and the 
Alt-right were near the critical value of Z = 2.49 (Z = 2.2 and Z = 2.0, respectively), but did not 
pass the threshold. In the non-violent passages, significant differences in significance restoration 
emerged between groups, Fisher’s = 50.860, p < .005, V = .553. Hizb ut-Tahrir was significantly 
more likely than chance to promote significance restoration in violent passages, Z = 8.2,   
α < .0001, whereas Neoconservatives were significantly less likely than chance to do so,   
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Z = -2.8, α = .0026. 
Significance maintenance. In the violent passages, there was no difference between levels of 
extremism on the likelihood of advocating for significance maintenance, χ2 (1, N = 57) = 0.032, 
p = .859. In the non-violent passages, however, a significant effect emerged,  
χ2 (2, N = 225) = 16.437, p < .005, V = .270. Non-violent extremists were significantly more 
likely than chance to promote significance maintenance, Z = 3.5, α = .0002, whereas moderates 
were significantly less likely than chance to do so, Z = -3.8, α = .0001. RVE groups did not 
significantly contribute to this effect, contrary to the hypothesis. 
 In non-violent passages, there was no significant difference between ideologies and the 
likelihood of preventing significance loss, χ2 (1, N = 225) = 2.274, p = .132. But, in violent 
passages, ideology did play a role in whether significance maintenance was promoted, such that 
Right-wing groups were significantly more likely than Islamic groups to promote significance 
maintenance, χ2 (1, N = 57) = 5.168, p = .023, Φ = .301.  
 In the violent passages, group membership was unrelated to whether significance 
maintenance was promoted, χ2 (3, N = 57) = 5.266, p = .153. In the non-violent passages, 
however, group membership was significantly related to whether preventing significance loss 
was promoted, χ2 (5, N = 225) = 21.347, p = .001, V = .308. Despite this, the only group with a 
significant impact on the overall chi-squared statistic was the Alt-right, which was significantly 
more likely than chance to mention significance maintenance, Z = 3.8, α = .0001. 
Loss of significance. The final examination of violent and non-violent passages and how they 
are used to activate significance quest dealt with LoS. LoS requires no action, but is simply a 
promulgation of loss of status of either the individual or the group (Kruglanski et al., 2014; 
Webber et al., 2017). In both violent and non-violent passages, level of extremism was 
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significantly related to LoS. In non-violent passages, χ2 (2, N = 226) = 42.741, p < .005,  
V = .435, non-violent extremists were significantly more likely than chance to promote LoS in 
their passages, Z = 5.0, α < .0001, whereas moderates were significantly less likely than chance 
to do so, Z = -6.4, α < .001, and RVE groups were no more likely than chance to do so, Z = 1.5,  
α = .0668. In violent passages, non-violent extremists were significantly more likely than RVE 
groups to promote LoS, χ2 (1, N = 57) = 16.437, p = .01, Φ = .360 
 To further examine these differences, group membership served as the independent 
variable. In non-violent passages, group membership was significantly related to whether LoS 
was present in a passage, χ2 (5, N = 226) = 50.526, p < .005, V = .473. Hizb ut-Tahrir and 
Neoconservatives were the major drivers of this statistic (Z = 4.4, α < .001 and Z = -5.1, α < .001, 
respectively) such that Hizb was significantly more likely than chance to use LoS in their 
passages whereas Neoconservatives were significantly less likely to do so. In violent passages, 
significant differences emerged between groups as well, Fisher’s = 20.077, p < .005, V = .596, 
such that Neo-Nazis were significantly more likely than chance to use LoS, Z = 2.5, α = .006, 
whereas ISIS/AQ was significantly less likely to do so, Z = -4.4, α < .0001. Both Hizb ut Tahrir 
and the Alt-right approached significant contributions (Z = 2.2 and Z = 1.5, respectively). It 
appears that in the initial analysis, the positive contribution of Neo-Nazis and the negative 
contribution of ISIS/AQ cancelled each other out, whereas the positive, albeit non-significant 
individual contributions of the Alt-right and Hizb combined to make non-violent extremists 
significantly more likely than RVE groups to use LoS in their passages. 
Discussion 
 A motif in nearly all of the analyses is that the strongest driver of significant group 
differences were the moderate groups (The Islamic Monthly and the Neoconservatives). 
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Although this lends support to the stated hypotheses, I believe that interpretation of the effect 
sizes should be made with caution. The group differences were often driven by moderate groups 
being less likely to use CTs and promote NFCC, anomie, and violence, rather than radical-
violent extremist groups being more likely to do so. Few differences emerged regarding radical-
violent extremist groups and extremist (yet non-violent) groups. This is not to say that the results 
should be discounted, but rather, that more exploration of the dataset is needed across a broader 
range of groups, passages, and CTs to arrive at more definitive conclusions. 
In line with the hypotheses regarding CT use, RVE groups were significantly more likely 
than non-violent extremists and moderates to use CTs in their publications. Additionally, non-
violent extremists were significantly more likely than moderates to use CTs. This fully supports 
the hypothesis. This difference was related only to violence and extremism and was unrelated to 
whether a group subscribed to Islamic or Right-wing ideology. However, an individual group 
difference emerged which was unexpected: Hizb ut-Tahrir was no more likely than chance to use 
CTs, whereas Alt-right groups were significantly more likely than chance to do so. The 
expectation was that this group would be just as likely as the Alt-right to use CTs. One 
explanation for this is that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s stated goal is the establishment of an Islamic 
caliphate, but they do not typically couch this goal in apocalyptic terms, unlike ISIS (Karagiannis 
& McCauley, 2006). Because of the key words used to parse the text, and the CTs randomly 
selected, many passages were pulled that mentioned a caliphate but lacked conspiratorial context, 
which lowered the percentage of CTs found in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s publications and may be a reason 
for the discrepancy between it and the Alt-right. For example, in issue 16 of Mukhtarat, the 
author argues that Islam is the only viable political ideology for a truly faithful nation, but does 
not mention any apocalyptic visions as a result: 
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It is time for us living in the West to realize the struggle that is taking place here to 
change Islam and take an active part to prevent this. This can only be done, brothers and 
sisters, by building a strong conviction that Islam is a complete din (religion/creed) that 
can address all our affairs in the 21st century and, moreover, it is Islam that has the 
solutions to the problems facing the  whole of humanity today (Mukhtarat, 2012; pg. 34). 
The hypothesis that RVE groups would be more likely to elicit NFCC through time 
pressure than non-violent extremist groups and moderate groups was also borne out. 
Additionally, non-violent extremist groups were significantly more likely than moderate groups 
to elicit NFCC. Unlike CT prevalence, however, Islamic groups were significantly more likely to 
use NFCC than right-wing groups, particularly Hizb ut-Tahrir, although ISIS and AQ also 
contributed to the differences. In the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir, many of the passages were direct 
calls to political action on local issues in Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. ISIS and AQ were 
not as likely as Hizb to use time pressure but were significantly more likely than chance to do so.  
 Interestingly, and contrary to expectations, Neo-Nazis and the Alt-right were not 
significant contributors to group differences in NFCC elicitation. One plausible explanation for 
this is that ISIS and Hizb needed recruits as they were publishing their content, whereas Neo-
Nazis and the Alt-right did not. Copello (2018) found that the publication of Dabiq began soon 
after ISIS declared itself a caliphate in 2014 and was ramping up its military offensive in Iraq 
and Syria. Disseminating propaganda with time pressure would be a way for ISIS to attract 
desperately-needed soldiers for a full-scale war. Hizb, although not engaged in a war, was trying 
to recruit members in a politically volatile region that seemed on the brink of large-scale political 
upheaval during the Arab Spring in 2011 (Erlich, 2014; Lister, 2015). Neo-Nazis and the Alt-
right, in contrast, were not occupying territory, nor were they fighting a war or toppling a regime. 
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Thus, the need for new members in these groups may not be as pressing as for the extremist 
Islamic groups. 
Additionally, ISIS has been active in recruiting adolescents and emerging adults, and  
NFCC plays an important role in in identity development and formation at these ages (Horgan, 
Taylor, Bloom, & Winter, 2016; “IS trains hundreds of child soldiers in Syria,” 2015). Older 
adolescents with low NFCC are more likely to explore and achieve new identities than those 
with an information-avoidant processing style, or high NFCC (Krettenauer, 2005). In other 
words, adolescents who have a high tolerance for ambiguity are more likely to explore their 
identity in relation to family, friends, and other social groups, and less likely to settle on an 
identity without considering their options.  Additionally, individuals with high NFCC adhere 
more closely to ingroup norms than those with low NFCC (Manchi Chao, Zhang, & Chiu, 2010). 
Radicalization most often occurs in groups of young men (Sageman, 2004), and those with high 
NFCC will be more likely to stay with an increasingly radicalized ingroup in spite of any moral 
or ethical qualms regarding their means of influence on society (e.g., violence toward civilians). 
 Anomie was significantly more likely in non-violent extremist publications than in RVE 
and moderate publications. This was contrary to the hypothesis that elicitation of mistrust would 
be most likely among RVE groups. The prevalence of anomie in the Alt-right and Hizb ut-Tahrir 
could be a function of target audience. Of the groups in this analysis, RVEs are the most 
radicalized, whereas the non-violent extremists are considered a “gateway” to further 
radicalization (Hartzell, 2018; Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006). Perhaps the non-violent 
extremist groups use anomie to drive people towards extremism, whereas the RVE groups 
presume that individuals reading their publications are sufficiently radicalized and do not need to 
be informed of the purported dishonesty of mainstream institutions. This is in line with internal 
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communications from the Alt-right (Anglin, 2017; Lyons, 2017). One of their main goals is to 
convince people who hold mainstream views (“normies”) that the institutions they trust are in 
fact lying to them and are either self-serving or working at the behest of larger, malevolent 
forces. For example, in Radix, the author argues that Obama’s national security team is bent on 
global hegemony and, because it is made up entirely of women, is either incompetent, cold, or 
angry: 
As the saying goes: Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned, and it seems rational 
decision making has no place in that inferno. So, who are these cast of characters lending 
a feminine touch to American global hegemony? I’d like to call them the sisterhood of 
the hashtag doctrine, styled after the film the sisterhood of the travelling pants.  They 
each represent an archetype that is portrayed in every cultural item about female groups 
and they definitely have “girl power” written onto their style... Susan Rice: she’s the 
token minority of the foreign policy crew. She does token minority things, such as 
demonstrating incompetence and playing the race card when she’s attacked. No matter – 
she’s now Obama’s national security adviser (M. McGregor, 2014). 
 In confirmation of the processes employed to classify groups, Neo-Nazis and ISIS/AQ 
were the only groups significantly more likely than chance to promote violent acts in their 
passages. Hizb and the Alt-right did have violence recommended in certain passages but 
combined, they only contributed nine of the 57 violent passages. In violent passages, ISIS/AQ 
was more likely than chance to promote significance gain, but not restoration or maintenance. 
This was unexpected as significance quest would suggest that RVE groups would be likely to use 
all three components of activation to drive recruitment. However, this could be a function of the 
string of military victories achieved during the period of publication. In many of the passages, 
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ISIS extols its fighters for the number of enemy combatants killed or the territory conquered and 
encourages other to follow suit.  
To the soldiers of the Khilafah and its supporters all over the world! To the predatory 
lions who pounced upon the beds of kufr, made it forget comfort, muddied the face of its 
intelligence agencies, and made safety a dream from amongst their many dreams! Know 
– may Allah support you with his aid – that your blessed operations turn the scales and 
turn the spout of the cannons of kufr away from the Muslims. Thus, attack them in their 
homes, markets, streets, clubs, and wherever they least expect it. Enflame the ground 
beneath their feet and blacken their skies so that they are busied with themselves. 
Multiply your efforts and intensify your operations, may Allah bless you (Islamic State, 
2016; pg. 7). 
In the passages analyzed, the grievances expressed about other groups came from a position of 
power, rather than from one of weakness. 
 ISIS/AQ was significantly less likely than chance to promote restoration and no more 
likely than chance to promote significance maintenance in both violent and non-violent passages. 
Again, this could be a function of the time period in which the selected passages were published. 
ISIS emerged from near destruction in Iraq to take over huge swathes of territory and declare 
itself a caliphate – something AQ never achieved, and indeed thought was too extreme (Lister, 
2015). ISIS held this territory for years, and recent documents have emerged suggesting that they 
ran an effective, albeit brutal, administrative state in Iraq and Syria (Callimachi, 2018). With 
these achievements, who needs grievances? ISIS was the winning side at the time, and many of 
their passages boast about their accomplishments: 
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We would not be exaggerating if we were to say that hundreds of movements, parties, 
and factions have arisen over the course of the past century claiming to be working for 
the return of the Khilafah, the implementation of the Shari’ah, and the establishment of 
the religion on the earth. However, they all failed to achieve that, despite some of them 
having reached a stage of either actual consolidation or pseudo-consolidation. Among 
them were those who even managed to establish some of the rulings of the Shari’ah, but 
the aforementioned aspirations were never achieved in their entirety except by the Islamic 
State, and virtue has and always will belong to Allah (Islamic State, 2016a; pg. 7). 
Non-violent extremists, on the other hand, were more likely to employ significance 
restoration in both violent and non-violent passages. Hizb was a significant contributor to group 
differences in significance restoration and LoS, whereas the Alt-right used significance 
maintenance significantly more often than chance. Significance restoration and maintenance 
require some grievance, and as with anomie, perhaps non-violent groups use restoration as a path 
towards further extremism. Alt-right passages often employed some sort of grievance, such as 
White people losing their rights or slowly being disenfranchised.  
Contrary to expectations, Neo-Nazis were no more likely than chance to promote 
significance gain, restoration, or maintenance in violent and non-violent passages, whereas the 
Alt-right was a significant contributor only in significance restoration in non-violent passages. 
However, Neo-Nazis used LoS frequently in their passages, which suggests that their approach 
to radicalization may be different than ISIS/AQ. Many of the passages from Neo-Nazis 
emphasized the supposed loss of rights that White people have experienced at the hands of 
minorities. 
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White power beliefs and ideals are anything that, by their very nature are conducive to, 
and in accordance with achieving the interests and objectives of white power -- that 
which is good for the white race, i.e., its safety, preservation, and advancement… Being 
under the boot-heel of those who seek our destruction (and/or the total elimination of 
‘whiteness’ -- ultimately translating into a state of full-blown submission), does not 
constitute survival and prosperity!  Needless to say, sitting on the sidelines will no longer 
suffice. The future of our race demands nothing less than full-blown effort, participation, 
and sacrifice (National Socialist Movement, 2015; pg. 12) 
Thus, these groups may be more interested in promoting grievances against mainstream 
institutions than in promoting action to prevent, maintain, or gain significance. 
Researchers investigating significance quest applied this concept to Islamic extremists 
only. In comparison to ISIS/AQ, Neo-Nazis have very little urgency for recruiting large numbers 
of new members. The movement is largely decentralized (“www.hatewatch.org,” 2018), and not 
in power in the countries in which they have significant membership. In light of the results in the 
current study, it seems that Neo-Nazis and the Alt-right, both of which are White-supremacist, 
are more interested in stoking grievances and/or restoring supposedly lost standing for White 
people than in calling for action to gain or maintain significance. Despite the fact that Neo-Nazis 
are a radical violent extremist group, they do not appear to follow the same pattern of 
significance quest in their publications as ISIS/AQ. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
A major limitation with this study is the inter-rater reliability achieved for NFCC. NFCC is 
the foundation for the theoretical underpinnings of this study; however, raters attempting to 
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identify its presence or absence disagreed occasionally on its presence. More passages should be 
coded by multiple raters to address this limitation. 
Another limitation of this study is the author’s lack of intimate knowledge of the Arabic 
language, Islam, and the Koran. The close reading of important texts such as the Koran and the 
Hadiths is instrumental in understanding the appeal of ISIS and other RVE groups in the Muslim 
world. The author has attempted to rely on reputable sources for translation of key words and 
phrases, but likely missed nuances in the language that would be apparent to one more versed in 
the culture. In the same vein, the publications used from Islamic sources except The Islamic 
Monthly were originally published in Arabic and then translated to English. Thus, this research 
approximates what English-speaking individuals would encounter in these publications, rather 
than the Arabic-speaking population. 
Violent Neo-Nazis, although becoming increasingly outspoken (Reid, Valasik, & Reid, 2018; 
Wilson, 2017), still have a difficult time getting a platform in the U.S. (Reuters, 2017). Neo-
Nazis as a whole are loosely organized, with no central authority issuing directives or controlling 
the narrative (Reid et al., 2018). Because of the fragmentary nature of the movement, finding 
representative publications was more difficult than for the other groups, and thus, the sample for 
Neo-Nazis may not be as reliable or accurate as that of the other groups.  
Additionally, many self-described Neo-Nazis who have or have had public platforms (e.g., 
Andrew Anglin of the Daily Stormer) explicitly denounce violence. This is done with a wink and 
a nod and is intended as a recruiting tactic to lure disaffected people to the movement and then 
gradually introduce more extreme views without scaring them away (“redpilling the normies,” in 
Far-Right parlance). Andrew Anglin himself, in a leaked style guide for his website, said,  
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The unindoctrinated should not be able to tell if we are joking or not. There should also be a 
conscious awareness of mocking stereotypes of hateful racists. I usually think of this as self-
deprecating humor - I am a racist making fun of stereotype of racists, because I don't take 
myself super-seriously. This is obviously a ploy and I actually do want to gas [racial slur 
referring to Jews]. But that's neither here nor there (Anglin, 2017; pg. 11).  
Although their views and end goals are implicitly violent and would require violent action to put 
into practice, their explicit, albeit superficial, nods to non-violence excluded them from the 
analyses. These groups should be the subject of future studies to examine how purportedly non-
violent Neo-Nazis use CTs to recruit members. 
The same issue arises with the Alt-right, which has become increasingly fractured since the 
murder of a counter-protestor in the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlotesville, Virginia in 2017 
(Nagle, 2017). Since then, many figureheads of the movement have lost influence and some of 
the most important content on the Alt-right comes from YouTube channels and podcasts such as 
The Daily Shoah and Alt-Right Radio. Important information about this movement and the 
recruitment methods its members employ could be gleaned from these alternative sources. 
Future research on text analysis of RVE and other groups is multi-faceted. In this 
particular dataset, multiple directions will be explored. First and foremost, the full list of CTs 
should be pulled from each source. Using the already-coded passages as input for a Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) algorithm may result in a more efficient exploration of the texts 
pulled from each source. In addition, coding not used in this paper was conducted on the 
passages used, including whether time pressure was construed as a failure to act (consequence) 
or a reward for acting, who the consequence or reward would accrue to, which institution anomie 
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was directed towards, and what the intention of lying was. Exploration of the uses of NFCC and 
anomie would yield further insight into the patterns of recruitment these groups engage in.  
Conclusion 
 In line with two hypotheses, RVE groups used CTs and NFCC more than non-violent 
extremists. The pattern with anomie was reversed, such that non-violent extremists were more 
likely than RVE groups to elicit distrust in mainstream institutions. Additionally, the activation 
of significance quest through violent passages was more complex than initially hypothesized: 
ISIS/AQ used significance gain, but neither maintenance nor restoration, whereas Neo-Nazis 
only used loss of significance.  
 Radical violent extremists using CTs to elicit NFCC implies that these groups do want to 
force potential recruits to make a decision quickly, a key component of activating significance 
quest. However, the fact that encouraging significance quest through violence and anomie was 
not a common theme suggests that the pathways to significance quest are not as straightforward 
as expected. It appears that the context in which the groups exist affects the types of language 
used in recruitment materials, regardless of the end goals of the groups. ISIS wants to establish a 
borderless theocracy based on Wahhabist interpretation of Sharia’h law, whereas Neo-Nazis seek 
to break the hold that Jews and Globalists supposedly have on world events and establish a 
White ethno-state (Ezekiel, 2002; Sageman, 2004; Warrick, 2016). Both seek to achieve these 
goals through violence and often rail against the same boogeymen: a cabal of malevolent 
individuals running the world for their own gain. Their goals are remarkably similar, but their 
relative positions of power appear to affect how they seek to motivate radicalization. 
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 Because ISIS had a functioning state it appears that they were more interested in 
promoting what potential recruits could gain from joining them, rather than what they could 
regain or prevent from losing. Neo-Nazis, on the other hand, have little political influence and 
thus sought to stoke grievances, rather than promote the power of their group. Now that ISIS has 
lost much of the territory it gained since 2014, their rhetoric may shift towards a more grievance-
oriented strategy, one seeking to regain the lost glory of the caliphate. Collectively, these 
findings indicate that the path towards significance quest may be different for different groups at 
different stages in their lifespan, and that geopolitical context is an important moderator of the 
theory of significance quest.  
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Appendix A 
Full list of conspiracy theories 
 
Conspiracy Theory Associated 
Group 
Language used Source(s) 




Bartlett & Miller, 2010; 
Gray, 2010 
War on Islam Islamic War on Islam, attack on 
Islam, war on Muslims, 
anti-Muslims 
Bartlett & Miller 
(2010); Gray (2010) 
Zionist-Christian 
apostate government 
Islamic taghut, murtad, takfir, 
kafir, apostate, idol, 
idolatry, infidel 
Bartlett & Miller 
(2010); Gray (2010); 
Lister (2015) 
National boundaries are 
illegitimate 
Islamic border, Sykes, Picot, 
nation-state 
Bartlett & Miller 
(2010); Gray (2010); 
Lister (2015) 
The establishment of 
the Caliphate will bring 
about the end times 
Islamic Khilafah, caliphate, 
apocalypse, end times 
Gray (2010); Lister 
(2015); Warrick (2016) 
Zionist Occupied 
Government (ZOG) 
Far-Right ZOG, Zionist Occupied 
Government 
Barkun, 2003; Bartlett 
& Miller (2010); Gray 
(2010) 





Bartlett & Miller 
(2010); Swami et al. 




Illuminati Far-Right Illuminati Barkun (2003); Bartlett 
& Miller (2010) 
False Flag Operation Far-Right False flag, inside job, 
crisis actor, 9/11, 7/7, 
Parkland, Sandy Hook, 
Orlando, Las Vegas, 
Paris 
Barkun (2003); Bartlett 
& Miller (2010); Swami 
et al. (2010); Swami et 
al. (2017); Warner & 
Neville-Shepard (2014) 
Freemasons Far-Right Freemasons Barkun (2003); Bartlett 
& Miller (2010) 
One World Government Far-Right One World 
Government, OWG 
Barkun (2003); Bartlett 
& Miller (2010) 
George Soros and/or his 
organization controls 
world events 
Far-Right Soros, George Soros, 
Soros Foundation 
Oliver & Wood (2014) 
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Race War is imminent Far-Right White genocide, race 
war, race traitor, 
eugenics, war on 
whites, white lives 
matter, all lives matter, 





Far-Right Libtard, gay agenda, 
Cultural Marxism, 
communist infiltration, 
culture war, Jewish 
Bolshevism 
Barkun (2003) 
Turner Diaries Far-Right Turner Diaries, The 
Order 
Bartlett & Miller (2010) 
FEMA concentration 
camps 
Far-Right FEMA, FEMA 
concentration camps 
Barkun (2003) 
Chemtrails Far-Right chemtrails Oliver & Wood (2014) 
Birtherism Far-Right birtherism, Obama birth 
certficate 
Oliver & Wood (2014); 
Warner & Neville-
Shepard (2014) 
Deep State Far-Right Deep State, the storm, 
Qanon 
“/cbts/ - Calm before 
the storm” (2017); “Q 
Anon - The storm” 
(2018); Deschamps 
(2017); Martineau 
(2017, 2018); Neiwart 
(2018); Weeast (2018) 
Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion 
Both The Protocols, Elders of 
Zion, Protocols of the 
Elders, Zion Protocols 
Bartlett & Miller 
(2010); Gray (2010) 
Jewish bankers 
manipulating events 
Both Jewish bankers, 
worldwide Jewry, 
Jewish lobby, The 
Franklin Prophecy, 
Jewish Tax, Kosher Tax 
Bartlett & Miller 
(2010); Brotherton et al. 
(2013); Gray (2010); 
Swami et al. (2010) 
Holy War Both Holy war Gray (2010); Lewis 
(2003) 
Holocaust Myth Both Holohoax, shoah, 
Holocaust myth, 
revisionist, revisionism 
Bartlett & Miller 
(2010); Gray (2010) 
Jews engaging in blood 
rituals 
Both blood ritual, blood libel, 
human sacrifice 
Bartlett & Miller (2010) 
Generic CTs Unspecified JFK assassination, John 
F. Kennedy, Moon 
landing, Princess Diana, 
Princess Di, AIDS, 
Brotherton et al. (2013); 
Swami et al. (2010); 
Swami et al. (2017) 
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population control, 
vaxxers, anti-vaccine  
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Appendix B 
Coding Scheme for Conspiracy Theories  
 
1. Is the excerpt a conspiracy theory? 
a. Does it indicate that malevolent actors are working behind the scenes to promote their 
own agenda? 
b. Does it fall into one of the categories listed in the CT table? 
c. If yes, 1 for “CT?” If not, 0 for “CT?” 
i. If 0, do not proceed to 2 through 5, simply move on to the next CT 
2. Which CT is it? 
a. See table for coding scheme 
3. Does CT activate NFCC through time pressure? 
a. Does it indicate that the individual reading it needs to act now? 
b. Time is running out, they need to make a decision, etc. 
c. Does it indicate that negative consequences will occur if the individual does not act 
quickly? 
i. Consequences: 
1. can range from those befalling the individual (i.e., “unless you do this 
soon, you have not acted in accordance with Allah’s will”)  
2. to the group (i.e., “unless you do this now, all Muslims will suffer”) 
d. Does it indicate that there will be positive rewards for acting quickly? 
e. If yes to any of the above, 1 for “NFCC” If not, 0 
4. Does CT activate anomie, or distrust of government institutions, or mainstream narratives?  
a. Does it indicate that the government, press, or other authority has lied about its 
intentions? 
b. Does it indicate that authority figures have covered up the “real truth”? 
c. Does it indicate that there is “more to the story” than what we are being told? 
d. Does CT indicate that a powerful, behind-the-scenes actor is actually controlling 
world events (i.e., Jews, bankers, corporations, etc.)? 
e. Does the CT explicitly question the motivations of mainstream sources of information 
(i.e., mainstream media)? 
i. e.g., “the media is controlled by Democrats, Jews, etc. with the intention of 
maintaining power” 
f. If yes to any of the above, 1 for “Anomie” If not, 0 
5. Does the CT indicate that the CT itself is “special knowledge,” that very few people are 
brave or smart enough to accept, understand, and/or act on? 
a. Implies a sort of superiority for those who believe the CT. They are braver, smarter, 
etc. than those who don’t believe it. 
6. Does CT explicitly promote violence as a means for achieving significance? 
a. Does CT or context of CT indicate that engaging in violence is a means for redressing 
wrongs perpetrated on the group? 
7. Does CT promote significance gain? 
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a. example: “we have full confidence in your motivations and capabilities. Unchain 
yourselves from the spineless leadership and deliver a victory that the ummah 
yearns for and has not seen since the era of the Khilafah, the shield of the 
Muslims. 
i. In this example, people are being implored to engage in actions of historical 
importance and to transcend 
8. Does CT promote significance restoration? 
a. Has to include a loss of significance – some sort of humiliation, as well as a path 
towards regaining significance 
b. example: “and the ugly truth of America and western kaffir countries was revealed to 
them, that they are blood suckers, and looters of  the ummah’s wealth, the truth of 
their vehement hatred and treacherous hostility to Islam and Muslims, and the 
truth of what  they brought to the Muslims and their countries, from turmoil, and 
what caused their destruction and decimation, and the  establishment of Israel, a 
sword hanging over their heads, and a dagger stabbed in their breasts,  despite all 
that the Muslims revised themselves, they became fully convinced that there is 
no salvation except by the return to  Allah and to restore his rulings in life.” 
i. In this passage, the West is said to have sucked the blood from Muslim lands 
and humiliate them, but that the honor of Muslims can be restored through the 
establishment of a caliphate. 
9. Does CT promote prevention of significance loss? 
a. This is more of an avoidant orientation: “unless you take some action, something bad 
will happen to you, the group, etc.” 
b. example: “at colleges across America, student protesters are intimidating 
conservatives who dare to attempt to speak...student-led intimidation and censorship 
can be found at colleges of all stripes, as the administration-imposed censorship of 
the speech-  code era in the 1990s gives way to something even worse—a rerun of 
the 1960s, in which radical students impose mob rule.” 
i. This passage is arguing that the Left is imposing “mob rule” on campus, 
invoking the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution, and arguing that the 
Right needs to stop it in order to keep free speech alive and America 
great…again 
c. example: “if only such a plan could have been implemented in 1941then, although 
the people of Hawaii would now be speaking Japanese, at least the war in 
Europe would have been won by white nationalists, and the Soviet Union would 
be out of the picture… we cannot hope for a strong and healthy military 
establishment until we have a strong and healthy civilian society. and we cannot 
have the latter until the entire spiritual and ideological basis on which it rests 
has been utterly transformed… although 30 per cent of the army is black, only 6.4 
per cent of the officer corps is. pentagon officials seem quite embarrassed about this 
discrepancy, apparently accepting the position that it is due to "discrimination." (such 
a stance might be expected, since jimmy carter's army is not unlike the pride an 
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animal trainer might show in being able to teach a one-legged chimpanzee to ride a 
bicycle: a marvelous feat, but so what” 
i. They go on to speak about allowing Black people in the military and argue 
that it’s a bad thing. So, to prevent the decline of the military and the risk to 
America as a result, we need to stop letting uneducated Black people into the 
military. 
 
